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Paradoxes, Gedanken
Experiments and The Burden of
Proof. A Response to Dr.
Cohen's Reply
David Kaye*
In a series of papers' I outlined a solution to what I called the problem

of naked statistical evidence. This problem, a hardy perennial in the law
of evidence, surfaced in Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Company,'
bloomed in Smith v. Rapid Transit Company," and induced a profusion

of secondary growth in the past two decades." The problem was restated
most recently by L. Jonathan Cohen in the guise of his "paradox of the
gate-crasher." 5 According to Cohen, this paradox is one of several that
© Copyright 1981 by David Kaye. All rights reserved.
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1. Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 34, 40 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as The Laws of Probability]; The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories,
1979 ARIz. ST. L.J. 101 [hereinafter cited as The Paradox of the Gatecrasher]; Naked Statistical
Evidence. 89 YALE L.J. 601 (1980) (book review) [hereinafter cited as Naked Statistical Evidence].
2. 307 Mass. 246, 29 N.E. 2d 825 (1940).
3. 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E. 2d 754 (1945).
4. E.g., M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW: STUDIES IN THE APPLICATION OF
PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS TO LEGAL PROBLEMS (1978); R. LEMPERT & S. SALZBURG, A MODERN
APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 178-80 (1977); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the
Legal Process. 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1339-43 (1971); Winter, The Jury and The Risk of Nonpersuasion, 5 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 335 (1971); Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and
Standards of Proof. 14 VAND. L. REV. 807 (1961).
5. As I pointed out in each of my previous articles, the gatecrasher paradox is not the only
weapon in Dr. Cohen's armamentarium. In Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 627, he observes that I have not analyzed, point by point, his other
arguments against the mathematical theory of probability. Nor shall 1. Others have undertaken this
task. See the authorities cited in Kaye, The Laws of Probability. supra note 1, at 38 n.18; Schum, A
Bayesian Account of Transitivity and Other Order-Related Effects in Chains of Inferential Reasoning, Rice Univ. Dep't of Psych. Research Rep. No. 79-04, Dec. 30, 1979; Schum, On Factors Which
Influence the Redundancy of Evidence and Coroborative Testimonial Evidence, Rice Univ. Dep't of
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reveal that the kind of "probability" at work in litigation does not conform to the axioms of mathematical probability.
In contrast, the analysis I delineated suggests that the familiar theory
of probability needs no revision to account for the reluctance of a few
courts to permit plaintiffs to prevail on the strength of background statistics alone. I am flattered that Dr. Cohen has found my treatment sufficiently penetrating to warrant a response. Still, I remain satisfied that one
need not adopt the esoteric mathematical structure he proposes to explain
the burden of proof in civil cases. In Part I, I show that whether or not
one accepts the subjective interpretation of probability, nothing in Cohen's most recent paper establishes that forensic probabilities are incommensurable with the usual mathematical axioms. In Part II, I consider, in
its own right, Cohen's claim that the subjective interpretation is a "dangerously inappropriate paradigm for the courts."
I.

THE SUITABILITY OF THE MATHEMATICAL AXIOMS

In earlier articles I described two distinct lines of argument reconciling
probability theory with the disfavored status of naked statistical evidence.7 The first was that even though resolving a factual issue according
to whether the relevant probability exceeds one-half maximizes the expected number of correct decisions, 8 the very policy of accuracy in decisionmaking also justifies finding against the proponent where the
probability is calculated from the background statistics alone.9 As I
stated:
Consider, for instance, Tribe's argument that the facts that the plaintiff was negligently run over by a blue bus and that the defendant
operates four-fifths of all the blue busses in town should not, without
more, support a verdict for the plaintiff. A rule of law denying the
plaintiff recovery in such a case would not establish that probabilistic
reasoning is inapplicable or that jurors would not be well advised to
find facts according to their best estimates of the relevant probabilities. It would merely reflect the policy that where individualized evidence is likely to be [readily] available--evidence which would typically permit better estimates of the probabilities than can be had from
Psych. Research Rep. No. 79-02, Mar. 1, 1979.
6. See Cohen, supra note 5 at 632.
7. To date, I have dealt only with the easy case in which the plaintiff can provide no satisfactory
explanation for his exclusive reliance on background statistics. I hope to analyze the more difficult
issue of "justified naked statistical evidence" in the near future.
8. Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence, supra note 1,at 605 n.19.
9. This point is a restatement, or perhaps an elaboration, of the suggestion made in Tribe, supra
note 4, at 1349.
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background statistics alone-plaintiffs should be forced to produce it.

In the long run, fewer mistaken verdicts should result under this rule
of law.10
Cohen does not address this logic in his rejoinder. Yet, the argument
suggests that ordinary probabilistic reasoning is compatible with judicial
disapproval of naked statistical evidence. Consequently, it is hard to see
how the problem of naked statistical evidence-whether posed in the form
of the gatecrasher paradox, the blue bus hypothetical, or the few decisions
on point--demands any departure from the axioms of probability theory.
My second way of justifying the legal rule without inventing new axioms involved distinguishing between "subjective" and various "objective"
interpretations of probability. I employed this" distinction to dispute the
implicit assumption that because a measured proportion p of a class of
objects has some property (501/1000 persons gatecrashed the rodeo, 4/5
blue busses belong to defendant, etc.), the object in question in a particular court case has the probability p of possessing the same property. I
challenged this assumption because it ignores a crucial feature of the situation in these cases. Presumably, the plaintiff could have produced more
probative evidence with little effort. The failure to adduce such evidence
suggests that the evidence would not have supported plaintiff's claim.
Hence, the probability calculated as the relative frequency p seems overstated. One way to incorporate this inference from non-production into a
formal analysis that uses the standard axioms is to apply an elementary
formula known as Bayes' Theorem.11
It is this second line of argument, and especially my reference to the
subjective interpretation of probability, that has attracted Cohen's attention. He insists that the subjective view is not suitable to modeling forensic decision making. Ironically, I have come to think that the debate over
the subjective conception of probability is something of a red herring
here. Contrary to what I may have suggested in my earliest writing, 2 the
subjective interpretation is not essential to my defense of the usual
probability axioms. After all, Bayes' formula, and every other result in

10. Kaye, The Laws of Probability, supra note 1, at 40 (footnotes omitted); cf. The Paradox of
the Gatecrasher, supra note 1, at 106 ("it may be appropriate to treat the subjective probability as
less than one-half, and therefore insufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff, simply to create an
'incentive for plaintiffs to do more than establish the background statistics.' ").
11. See Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher, supra note I, at 107-08; Probability Theory
Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1474-81 (1979).
12. Compare Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher, supra note 1, at 106 ("This distinction
between objective and subjective interpretations . . . is crucial") with Naked Statistical Evidence,
supra note 1, at 609 ("My argument is most easily developed with the aid of the subjective
interpretation").
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probability theory, works as well with "objectively" ascertained probabilities as with subjectively estimated ones, and the probabilities that jurors
must estimate, however inchoately, can be construed as relative frequencies, degrees of confirmation, objective chances, or any of the other interpretations proffered by philosophers of mathematics.13 If I am right in
this regard, it follows that the truth of Cohen's thesis-that the gatecrasher example establishes that the probability axioms break down as
applied to forensic proof-in no way turns on whether one adopts a subjective interpretation of probability.
Of course, Cohen is not fond of the prevalent relative frequency view of
probability either. In this latest essay he unveils a new hypothetical case
intended to show that what counts in forensic proof is "the build-up of a
suitable weight of evidence" rather than "a mere frequency (which could
be just accidental)." The example involves a man killed in an automobile
accident. The factual issue is said to be'whether, but for the negligence of
the defendant, the man would have survived to age 70. Cohen points out
that it would not do to deduce the probability of this event by looking to
the number of males who were once the age of the deceased but who
subsequently lived to be 70 and then comparing this number to the total
number of males who lived at least as long as the deceased. This relative
frequency calculation would be too crude. Additional characteristics of
the deceased permit a more refined calculation. It seems that the deceased
was a coal miner, suffered from incipient silicosis, had decided to work
above ground, and so on. At this stage, Cohen is simply partitioning the
sample space so as to compute the relevant probability on the basis of all
the available information. Equivalently, one could use Bayes' formula,
with probabilities ascertained from relative frequencies, to incorporate the
effect of each additional datum on the initial, crudely ascertained
probability of survival." ' There is no need to introduce an ordinal grading
according to "the weight of the evidence." The various items of evidence

13. Kaye, The Laws of Probability, supra note 1, at 47-53.
14. See generally Schum, A Bayesian Account of Transitivity and Other Order-Related Effects
in Chains of Inferential Reasoning. supra note 5; Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MiCH. L. REV.
1021 (1977). To illustrate the formal analysis in the context of this example, let Hc stand for the
event that the deceased would have become a septuagenarian. Let H denote the complementary hypothesis, that he would not have lived this long. Let P. be the probability of H as determined from
date on the entire male population. Dr. Cohen takes P0 to be .7. Bayes' formula tells us that for an
additional item of evidence E,,
P0
P,
(1)
=LE,
(
)
I-P0
I-P,
where P, is the probability of H considering E, as well as the prior data, and LEI is the likelihood
ratio for El. This ratio is defined in terms of the conditional probabilities of E,:
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are merely used to arrive at the appropriate relative frequency.
Nonetheless, Cohen goes on to say that calculating relative frequencies
fails because "accidental" rather than "causal" factors may be involved.
In the context of the coal miner case he writes: "It could well be the case
that the deceased's surname contained six letters and that the frequency
of those with six-letter-names surviving to age 70 is greater than the frequency in the population at large. But that fact would be quite irrelevant
to the matter at issue because it is only an accident and not the manifestation of some causal link between name-length and longevity." 16 On this
basis, Cohen concludes that "the type of Pascalian probability that is
characteristically in the courts is [not] a mere frequency," for a mere
frequency "could just be accidental." 1
I must confess that I find this portion of Dr. Cohen's paper hard to
follow, but there seem to be at least two serious flaws in the discussion.
For one, the example itself is deceptive. Surely the real reason that namelength is legally irrelevant to the issue of expected lifespan is that we
know very well (or think we do) that there is no statistically significant
association between these two variables. Were we actually confronted
with a finite population in which substantially more men with six-letter
names became septuagenarians, then the evidence would be relevant.
Such evidence would, in the language of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
tend "to make the existence of [a] fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be

P(EIH)
LE,

=

(2)
P(EJIHc
For example, if E, denotes the fact that the deceased was a coal miner with incipient silicosis, the
likelihood ratio could be obtained from survival table showing (a) the proportion of males (of the age
of the deceased) who survive to age 70 who are coal miners with incipient silicosis, and (b) the
proportion of males who reach age 70 who are not coal miners with incipient silicosis. If it were found
that these proportions stood in the ratio of two to seven, LE would be taken to be 2/7 under a
relative frequency approach. For (I) the revised probability o H would then be .4, as Dr. Cohen's
postulates. It is easy to show that for n items of evidence El, E,, . . . En about the deceased, the
probability of survival, considering these successive refinements, is related to the crude figure for all
males of the age of the deceased by the equation
P0
Pn
= LEn LEn. I . .. LEI(
I°Pn

where LEn

=

P(EnIHEIE 2 ...
EnI)
P(En IHCE I E2 . . . En- 1
P(EnIHcEIE 2 . .. E.

15. See Cohen, supra note 5 at 633.
16.

Id.

)
I-P,

(3)
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without the evidence." 1 This is to say, contrary to what Cohen implies,
that there is no legal requirement of causal as opposed to purely statistical
association. For example, evidence as to gender is relevant in wrongful
death cases even though, to my knowledge, the courts do not entertain the
belief that possessing a pair of X chromosomes causes longer life. It suffices that there is an unexplained but well documented statistical dependence between gender and lifespan in contemporary society.le
Second, even if the claim that a "causal" rather than a statistical relation is a prerequisite to legal relevance were well taken, this would not
show that to decide a disputed factual question one must look to an ordinal grading according to the weight of the evidence instead of the weight
of the evidence expressed as a cardinal probability number. No doubt,
Cohen is correct when he insists that a mere frequency does not always
supply a suitable figure for the pertinent probability. We have already
seen that the class of objects must be defined with some care before a
final relative frequency is measured. If, as part of this effort, we also need
a "causal-propensity criterion" to avoid computing the wrong relative frequency, then so be it."9 It is still probabilities conforming to the mathematical axioms that determine, subject to certain constraints of policy,
how contested factual issues should be resolved.
Upon inspection, then, Cohen's latest arguments do not add much to
his case against mathematical probability. The problem of naked statistical evidence can be handled without substituting inductive probabilities
for the familiar mathematical ones. Moreover, this is so whether one in-

17. FED. R. EvID. 40. For a careful analysis of legal relevance using mathematical probability
theory and confirming this conclusion, see Lempert, supra note 14.
18. Since Cohen does not explicitly define what he means by "accidental" and "causal," I may be
using these terms somewhat differently than he. It might be said, for instance, that gender is a causal
factor in lifespan inasmuch as the "appropriate counterfactual inference," Cohen, supra note 5, at
634, involves an alteration in probable lifespan. Under this view, however, the only "accidental" links
would seem to be those that have been observed more often than not but which we somehow know
would not be detected in such number in a much larger sample of observations. But this merely says
that the apparent association between the two variables is not statistically significant. Accordingly,
the evidence is of little probative value and should be excluded-though not because of any defect in
probability theory or the relative frequency interpretation.
19. As developed by Pierce, Popper, and others, propensity theories of probability are proposed as

distinct alternatives to relative frequency interpretations. E.g., J. MACKIE, TRUTH, PROBABILITY AND
PARADOX: STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 155-57, 179-86 (1973). As described by Cohen in the
coalminer example, however, the propensity "criterion" seems to supplement a simple relative frequency theory. For present purposes, nothing much turns on this distinction. Construing probability
as the manifestation of innate "dispositions" or "propensities" does not entail denying that probabilities behave in accordance with the standard mathematical axioms. For some views on the merits of
the propensity interpretations of mathematical probabilities, compare D. MELLOR, THE MATTER OF
CHANCE (1971) (defending propensity theory) with J. Mackie, supra, at 187 ("there are strong reasons for doubting whether . . . propensity theory has ontologically valid applications.").
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terprets probabilities as subjective estimates, relative frequencies, causal
propensities, or the like. Persistent riddles as to how a sample space

should be partitioned and how the probabilities of elementary events
should be obtained ought not be confused with the very different issue of
whether these numbers -

however they may be arrived at -

obey the

probability axioms. 0 With respect to the latter question, it seems clear
that the mathematical theory of probability has shown itself to be a useful
tool in describing and criticizing many features of the law of evidence.
At the same time, I believe that the applicability of the subjective inter-

pretaion of probability to juridical proof - the principal subject of Dr.
Cohen's paper - is an important and interesting question in its own
right. It is to this topic that I now turn.
II.

THE SUITABILITY OF THE SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION

Most interpretations of probability are strained when applied to the
unique, non-repeatable events that are ordinarily the subjects of litigation.
The subjective view, however, seems congenial to modeling legal factfinding. For heuristic purposes at least, jurors can be visualized as making
personal estimates of the probability that the events in question took place
in the manner described by the plaintiff or defendant and deciding the
case in accordance with these estimates. The results of such a model can
then be employed in normative or descriptive ways.21
In The Provable and the Probable, Dr. Cohen denied the aptness of
this subjective interpretation on two grounds. 22 I took issue with him on
both.2" In rebuttal, he now defends one of his original arguments, omits
any mention of the other, 2'4 and introduces yet a third. His remaining
opening argument is that the statements a juror might make about bet-

20. The need to draw such a distinction always arises when it comes to making use of axiomatized
systems. In applying Euclidean geometry, for instance, the suitability of the postulates (particularly
the parallel postulate) is one issue; the procedure for measuring the entities presumed to be subject to
these axioms (lines, angles, etc.) is another matter. But see H. REICHENBACK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SPACE AND TIME

(1953).

21. See Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res lpsa Loquitur, supra note I1, at 1456-57.
22. Roughly, these were that the betting odds conceptualization of subjective probability cannot
apply because there is no independent procedure for resolving hypothetical bets about facts controverted by litigants, and because the odds a juror would accept depend in part on the magnitude of the
bet.
23. See Kaye, The Laws of Probability, supra note I, at 45-46. For another criticism of Cohen's
treatment of sujective probability, see SCHUM, BOOK REVIEW, 77 MICH. L. REV. 446, 478 (1979).
24. Although I did not realize it at the time, the principal argument I advanced in the Laws Of
Probability to refute Cohen's claim that subjective probabilities are poorly defined because coherent
betting quotients depend on the size of the wager was already set out quite clearly and forcefully in
the philosophical literature. See D. MELLOR, supra note 19, at 34-37. Cohen's continued refusal to
recognize this argument, let alone to come to grips with it, is disappointing.
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ting odds or lottery tickets would carry no conviction and have no meaning without some realistic way of settling the bet or the lottery. He goes
so far as to say that bets or lotteries about litigated facts could not be
settled without deterministic metaphysics, perfect social sciences, and indelible traces of the past."
Although one senses a bit of hyperbole here, I have no doubt that were
jurors really to gamble on the truth of their findings, a great many of
their bets could not be settled even with the expenditure of inordinate
sums of money and the most invasive forms of interrogation. As Cohen
notes, only H.G. Wells' time machine would permit every controversy to
be resolved with certainty. But this observation is not a telling rejoinder to
the suggestion that the probabilities implicitly at work in legal factfinding
can be given a conceptually meaningful subject interpretation. Betting
odds, lottery tickets (and bids for reference contracts) are merely heuristic devices for describing, in ways that are easily visualized, preferences
and choices under conditions of risk. Decision theory reveals that as long
as a person acts in accordance with his preferences among alternative
risky outcomes and that as long as these preferences have certain plausible properties, that person can be said to be predicating his choices on
subjective, but mathematically well-behaved probabilities. Cohen's position to the effect that "nothing whatever [is] at risk" is difficult to reconcile with the obvious fact that in the uncertain world of litigation, jurors
always risk making erroneous decisions. By definition, conscientious jurors
care about this. They would prefer to avoid such outcomes. Their decisions are thereby "constrained by considerations of risk" - the omnipresent risk or error, even if in most cases such errors are never discovered. 2
If need be, the same point can be made in terms of wagers and the like.
The purpose of depicting hypothetical wagers, lotteries, or reference contracts is not to persuade jurors to make book on disputed issues of fact.
Rather, it is to exhibit a reasonably concrete but entirely theoretical procedure for generating, in principle, a set of numbers conforming to the
probability axioms. Of course, this procedure cannot be implemented in
the legal context, or for that matter, in any other. A living specimen of
the "rational" decisionmaker has yet to be exhibited. But this limitation
does not indicate any defect in the proof that subjectively produced esti-

25.

See Cohen, supra note 5 at 632.

26. It may be worth noting that factually erroneous verdicts do not invariably escape detection.
Subsequent information tending to confirm or contradict a verdict does sometimes come to light, a
consideration that may further prompt conscientious jurors to make as accurate an assessment of the
probabilities in question as can be had on the basis of the evidence at bar. A recent, scandalous
illustration of such belatedly discovered information is provided in The Times (London), June 20,
1981, at 1, c. 4.
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mates can have the same mathematical properties as objectively measured
ones. In fact, the impracticability of the procedure is typical of all
gedanken experiments. One can deduce the famous equation E = mc2 by
thinking about what would happen in a rigid box with a burst of photons
bouncing off an inside surface. 27 Yet, no physicist would seriously consider obtaining an experimental verification of the mass-energy relationship in this way.
So, to undermine the subjective interpretation, it must be demonstrated
that even the completely hypothetical, inexorably rational creature of decision theory would be at a loss to state the odds, lottery tickets, or bids
that he would find acceptable if a wager, lottery or sale actually could be
held. The structure of this individual's preferences for the relevant (admittedly imaginary) outcomes (that he will be proved correct in having
agreed that event X is as plaintiff contends, that he will be given a certain
sum of money with some probability p, and so on) must be shown to contradict the decision theoretic axioms of rational choice. Since, by hypothesis, the decisionmaker is rational and willing to think about such outcomes, it is not surprising that no such showing has been made.28
This leaves only Dr. Cohen's newly stated objection to the subjectivist
thesis. In essence, he complains that subjective probabilities are, well,
subjective. They can vary from person to person. Initially, one might have
thought that this characteristic would have commended the subjective interpretation to us. Jurors hearing the same evidence do sometimes reach
different conclusions. Yet, Cohen finds the personal quality of the subjective interpretation unpalatable because it puts "the probability with which
a point has been proved . . . wholly outside the framework of rational

controversy. ' 9
Again, the complaint seems misguided. Without question, there is no
logical inconsistency in A stating that "for me, the probability is .7," and

27. A. Einstein, 20 ANN. PHysics, 627 (1906).
28. Seen in this light, Cohen's quarrel with the subjectivist thesis rests on a claim about human
psychology-namely, that the human mind cannot or will not produce by subjective means a set of
numbers that conform to the probability axioms unless it is placed in an actual, rather than a hypothetical condition of risk. This claim misses the point. No one expects any human being to achieve
perfect coherence even in real-world situations. The rigorous subjective formulation of probability
works for hypothetical decision makers only. Why should placing these unreal entities in hypothetical
situations preclude them from achieving consistency in their efforts to ascertain probabilities?
Naturally, whether actual jurors come close to attaining this coherence in their unarticulated

probability estimates is an empirical question. See Schum & Martin, Empirical Studies of Cascaded
Inference in Jurisprudence: Methodological Considerations, Rice Univ. Dep't of Psych. Research
Report No. 80-01, May 30, 1980. i merely contend that for theoretical purposes, subjectively ascertained probabilities can be assigned to events of interest in litigation.
29. See Cohen, supra note 5 at 630.
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in B asserting that "for me, the probability is only .3." If A and B are not
lying, the two propositions have the same truth value. But this truth-functional equivalence does not preclude an advocate from insisting that the
better subjective estimate is .7. Acceptance of the subjective thesis does
not make it irrational to tell B "I understand that your indifference point
now falls at odds of 3 to 7. But for you to accept the bet at those odds
would be sheer foolishness. My client's claim is*by no means as unlikely
as you seem to think. Here is why .

. . ."

And, at this point, counsel

gives his or her concluding statement.
In other words, the subjective view does not commit one to the position
that there is no right answer. It simply recognizes that it is not always
possible for persons with different attitudes, experiences, and information
to arrive at identical answers.30 Rational discussion of subjective
probability figures is therefore not barred. 1 Thus, returning to my treatment of the paradox of the gate-crasher, I argued in part that to conclude
that the subjective probability in plaintiff's favor is .501 would be to give
a wrong answer. This answer would be wrong, I suggested, because it
apparently overlooks the fact of non-production. In making this argument,
I was asserting not only that .501 is the wrong figure for me, but also that
it is wrong for any person to be satisfied with this number for his subjective probability. I think it fair to say that my discussion was located somewhere within the universe of rational discourse.
The notion that subjective probabilities are expressions of degrees of
belief and that such "partial beliefs" can be rationally justified is nothing
new to philosophers who study the foundations of probability and induction. 32 A propensity theorist may be persuaded that what justifies some
particular degree of belief is an objective property of an event, which he
calls its "propensity.""3 Other theorists may find the justification in some
relation that the proposition partly believed bears to other propositions. 3 4

30. Rational individuals with identical utilities, data, and background information would arrive at
the same subjective probabilities.
31. In suggesting that there are interpersonal standards by which subjective probabilities can be
judged, I might be thought to be injecting an element of "objectivity" into subjective probability.

Such objectivity would be present if the standards were not merely conventional, like those at work in
the appreciation of haute cuisine, but somehow "objectively" correct. All I mean to say here is that
the subjective theory treats probabilities as statements of personal beliefs about the outcomes of
events. Whether these beliefs can be said to have some objective basis is an issue that is not resolved
by the use of the word "subjective." Indeed, in this context, the phrase "personal probability" might
be more apposite.
32.
33.

See, e.g., J. MACKIE, supra note 19, at 158.
See, e.g., D. MELLOR, supra note 19, at 2, § 18-19.

34. Carnap, for instance, wrote that a rational person should assess the probability of a proposition by its relation to his "total evidence" for and against it. R.

CARNAP, REPHES AND SYSTEMATIC
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Analytical philosophers might insist that the interpersonal standards of
justification to which I have alluded are implicit in some set of canonical
examples of "correct" probabilistic reasoning. Needless to say, still other
views are possible. The point that bears emphasizing here is that one can
surely hold that subjective probabilities are well suited to the study of
forensic proof while firmly maintaining a discreet agnosticism as to which
camp of philosophers has found the correct answer to the question of what
it really is that makes one degree of belief more justified than all other
degrees of belief.
I should be surprised if this defense of subjective probability against the
charge of standardless subjectivism will prove entirely satisfying to Dr.
Cohen. It does not, after all, go to the root of the philosophical problem.
Nevertheless, it is all that is needed to cope with the issue of naked statistical evidence. Dr. Cohen's arguments not only fail to elucidate any irreparable incongruity between mathematical probability theory and the standard of proof in civil litigation; they also do not reveal any
insurmountable conceptual barrier to using the subjective interpretation
to understand the probabilities implicitly at work in legal factfinding. Dr.
Cohen's latest paper is thus much like his erudite volume, The Provable
and the Probable. Both works are replete with intriguing insights, provocative passages, and ingenious arguments. Yet, for all the creativity and
resiliency displayed in defense of the claim that the paradox of the gatecrasher points up some fundamental dissonance between mathematical
probability theory and forensic proof, the case for Dr. Cohen's "Baconian" probabilities is considerably less powerful than Dr. Cohen will as
yet admit.

ExPOSITIONS, IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP,

859, 972 (P. Schilp ed. 1963).

